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1 Introduction
This paper studies how the equilibrium outcome of a game varies with the set of feasible
alternatives. We focus on finite perfect-information extensive-form games where all players
have strict preferences over the alternatives attached to the terminal nodes. In any such
game, Kuhn’s (1953) backwards-induction algorithm yields a unique outcome. If only a
subset of alternatives remains feasible, pruning the original tree of all branches leading to
infeasible alternatives defines a new game. Applying Kuhn’s algorithm to this restricted
game again yields a unique outcome. Applying the algorithm to every restricted game
thus generates a choice function, that is, a mapping selecting a single alternative from
each feasible subset. We are interested in the general properties of this choice function,
namely, those that do not depend on the number of players or the particular structure of
the game tree.
It should be clear that such a choice function need not be well-behaved. Consider for
instance the game G4 in Figure 1 where we indicate the relevant parts of the players’ pref-
erences next to each decision node and the corresponding outcome next to each terminal
node. The backwards-induction outcome of that game is alternative 3. The outcome of
the game restricted to the feasible set {1, 2} is 1, the outcome restricted to {1, 3} is 1, and
the outcome restricted to {2, 3} is 2. This is the choice function f 4 in Table 1, omitting
the trivial choices from singletons. The collective choice behavior described by this choice
function is highly irrational since the alternative chosen from the universal set is the only
alternative that is never chosen from any pair—the Condorcet loser of the base relation
associated with f 4.
Up to a relabeling of the alternatives, Table 1 depicts all the possible three-alternative
choice functions. The reader will easily check that each of the choice functions f 1, f2, f3, f4
is generated by the game bearing the corresponding label in Figure 1. This shows that
when there are only three conceivable alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of
a game may change in a totally arbitrary fashion with the set of feasible alternatives.
B f 1(B) f 2(B) f 3(B) f 4(B)
{1, 2} 1 1 1 1
{1, 3} 1 3 1 1
{2, 3} 2 2 2 2
{1, 2, 3} 1 1 2 3
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(b) The game G4.
Figure 1: The three-alternative case.
This result generalizes. Say that a choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset
of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that
subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every
choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Our paper belongs to an emerging literature applying the revealed preference ap-
proach to the study of collective decisions. The general goal is to identify the testable
restrictions of the main theories of collective decision-making when individual preferences
are not observable. We briefly review here the part of that literature which deals with
noncooperative game-theoretic solution concepts.
Yanovskaya (1980), Sprumont (2000) and Galambos (2005) consider choice correspon-
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dences defined over Cartesian subproducts of a given n-player normal game form. They
identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which there exist n preferences over
the conceivable joint actions such that the joint actions selected from each subgame form
coincide with the Nash equilibria of the corresponding subgame. Lee (2012) characterizes
choice behavior that is rationalizable via Nash equilibria of zero-sum games.
Ray and Zhou (2001) fix a finite-length game tree and an assignment of the decision
nodes to a given set of n agents. They study choice functions defined over the restrictions
of this game form. They give conditions under which there exist n (strict) preferences over
the terminal nodes such that the alternative chosen in each restricted game form coincides
with the backwards-induction outcome of the game generated by these preferences and
the restricted game form. See also Ray and Snyder (2003).
In contrast with Ray and Zhou (2001) we do not fix the number of players or the
grand game form. The choice functions we consider are therefore defined on subsets of
alternatives—as in Arrow’s (1959) classical formulation—rather than on restricted game
forms. We do this in order to identify the behavioral implications of backwards induction
which do not depend on the particular characteristics of the environment. It turns out
that there is none. Xu and Zhou (2007) perform the same exercise as ours under the
rather particular restriction that each alternative can be attached to a terminal node
of the grand game form once and only once. This restriction does constrain the choice
functions that can be rationalized. While Xu and Zhou (2007) note (without a proof)
that all three-alternative choice functions are backwards-induction rationalizable in the
unrestricted-population case without their additional condition, they explicitly state that
the general case represents an open question.
The unrestricted-population approach we follow in this paper is well established in
economic theory. Our “anything-goes theorem” is in the spirit of results obtained in
completely different contexts such as the Debreu (1974) – Mantel (1974) – Sonnenschein
(1973) theorem on the aggregate excess demand of an exchange economy or McGarvey’s
(1953) theorem on majority tournaments.
2 Definitions
Let A = {1, . . . ,m} be a finite universal set of alternatives. For any non-empty subset B
of A, the power set of B excluding the empty set is denoted by P(B). A choice function
(on B) is a mapping f :P(B)→ B such that f(C) ∈ C for all C ∈ P(B). An ordering is
a reflexive, complete, transitive and antisymmetric relation. We denote by RB the set of
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orderings on B.
A choice function f on B is best-element rationalizable if there exists an ordering R∗
on B such that
f(C) = max(C;R∗)
for all C ∈ P(B), where max(C;R∗) = {a ∈ C | aR∗b for all b ∈ C}. In this case, we
say that R∗ is a best-element rationalization of f or that R∗ best-element rationalizes f .
If there are at most two alternatives in B, any choice function f on B is best-element
rationalizable: the case in which B is a singleton is trivial and if B contains exactly
two elements, f is best-element rationalized by the relation R∗ given by f(B)R∗b where
{b} = B \ {f(B)}.
The choice function f is (irrational) of degree k ≥ 1 if
(i) there exists an ordering R∗ on B and a collection C = {C1, . . . , Ck} of k distinct
subsets of B such that f(C) 6= max(C;R∗) for all C ∈ C and f(C) = max(C;R∗) for all
C ∈ P(B) \ C; and
(ii) for all orderings R
′
on B and for all collections C ′ = {C ′1, . . . , C ′k′} of k
′
< k distinct
subsets of B, there exists C ∈ P(B) \ C ′ such that f(C) 6= max(C;R′).
In this case, we say that R∗ underlies the choice function f and we call C the collection
of critical sets of f with respect to R∗.
Let ≺ be a transitive and asymmetric relation on a non-empty and finite set N . We
say that n ∈ N is a direct predecessor of n′ ∈ N if n ≺ n′ and there exists no n′′ ∈ N
such that n ≺ n′′ ≺ n′ . Equivalently, we say that n′ is a direct successor of n in this case.
The set of direct predecessors of n ∈ N is denoted by P (n), and S(n) is the set of direct
successors of n.
A tree Γ is given by a quadruple (0, D, T,≺), where:
(i) 0 is the root ;
(ii) D is a finite set of decision nodes such that 0 ∈ D;
(iii) T is a non-empty and finite set of terminal nodes such that D ∩ T = ∅;
(iv) ≺ is a transitive and asymmetric precedence relation on the set of all nodes N =
D ∪ T such that:
(iv.a) P (0) = ∅ and |S(0)| ≥ 1;
(iv.b) for all n ∈ D \ {0}, |P (n)| = 1 and |S(n)| ≥ 1;
(iv.c) for all n ∈ T , |P (n)| = 1 and S(n) = ∅.
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When considering two trees Γ and Γ′, we identify the components in the obvious
fashion, that is, Γ = (0, D, T,≺) and Γ′ = (0′, D′, T ′,≺′). Likewise, the sets of direct
predecessors and direct successors of a node n ∈ N according to ≺ are P (n) and S(n),
whereas these sets for n ∈ N ′ according to ≺′ are denoted by P ′(n) and S ′(n). This
should not create any ambiguity.
A path in Γ from a decision node n ∈ D to a terminal node n′ ∈ T (of length K ∈ N)
is an ordered (K + 1)-tuple (n0, n1, . . . , nK) ∈ N |K+1| such that n = n0, {nk−1} = P (nk)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and nK = n′.
A game (on B) is a triple G = (Γ, g, R) where Γ is a tree, g:T → B is an outcome
function that assigns an alternative g(n) ∈ B to each terminal node n ∈ T , and R:D →
RB is a preference assignment map that assigns an ordering R(n) on B to each decision
node. This is a simplified version of a perfect-information game because the set of players
is implicitly identified with the set of decision nodes and preferences are assumed to be
antisymmetric. Again, we use the obvious notation (Γ′, g′, R′) for a game G′ etc.
Let G be a game on B. For any C ∈ P(B) such that C ⊆ g(T ), the restriction of G
to C is the game G|C = G′ = (Γ′, g′, R′) on C given by:
(i) 0′ = 0;
(ii) D′ = {n ∈ D | there exist n′ ∈ g−1(C) and a path in Γ from n to n′};
(iii) T ′ = g−1(C);
(iv) ≺′ is the restriction of ≺ to N ′ = D′ ∪ T ′;
(v) g′ is the restriction of g to T ′;
(vi) for all n ∈ D′, R′(n) is the restriction of R(n) to C.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of a game G on a set B = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and its restriction
G′ = G|C to C = {1, 4}. The arrows emanating from the terminal nodes point to the
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Figure 2: A game on B = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and its restriction to C = {1, 4}.
For each decision node n ∈ D, we denote by en(G) the backwards-induction outcome
of the subgame of G rooted at n. This outcome is defined in the usual way: we first set
en(G) = g(n) for all n ∈ T , then define recursively en(G) = max({en′(G) | n′ ∈ S(n)} ;R(n))
for all n ∈ D. To simplify notation we write e0(G) = e(G). Because G is a finite perfect-
information game and all preferences are antisymmetric, the backwards-induction outcome
of any subgame of G (including G itself) exists and is unique. For every C ∈ P(B), the
backwards-induction outcome of G|C is also well defined.
A choice function f on B is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a game
G = (Γ, g, R) on B such that f(C) = e(G|C) for all C ∈ P(B). In this case, we say that G
is a backwards-induction rationalization of f or that G backwards-induction rationalizes
f .
3 Results
The following two lemmas provide important steps in the proof of our main result. We
begin with choice functions of degree 1 whose only critical set is the set of all alternatives.
Lemma 1 Let B ∈ P(A), let R∗ ∈ RB and let b0 ∈ B \max(B;R∗). The choice function
f on B defined by
f(C) =
{
max(C;R∗) if C 6= B,
b0 if C = B
is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Proof. Let B, R∗, b0 and f be as in the statement of the lemma. Without loss of
generality, assume that B = {1, . . . , p} for some p and that R∗ is the natural ordering ≤
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on {1, . . . , p}. Thus, the best element in a non-empty subset C of B according to R∗ can
be written as min(C) without any danger of ambiguity. Moreover, b0 6= 1. Let G be the
game on B depicted in Figure 3. For simplicity of presentation, we do not include the
labels of the terminal nodes but, instead, attach the outcomes according to the outcome
function. The preferences assigned to each decision node (that is, to each player) are
displayed to the right of the respective node. We simplify our exposition by restriction
attention to the part of the preferences that is relevant for the argument. For instance, all
that we need to know regarding the preferences associated with nodes p+1, . . . , 2p− 1 is
that one of the two alternatives that can feature as a possible choice at the respective node
is preferred to the other. Analogously, there is no need to specify where the alternative
b0 is ranked in the preference assigned to node p − 1 because it can never appear as a
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Figure 3: The game G on B in the proof of Lemma 1.
We claim that f(C) = e(G|C) for all C ∈ P(B). Let C ∈ P(B). We distinguish four
cases.
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Case 1. C = B. By definition of R(p − 1) and R(2p − 1), we have ep−1(G|B) =
ep−1(G|C) = 1 and e2p−1(G|C) = b0, hence
ep−2(G|C) = b0.
Since ep+q(G|C) 6= 1 for all q ∈ {1, . . . , p − 2}, we obtain from the definition of the
orderings R(p− 3), . . . , R(0) that
ep−2(G|C) = b0 ⇒ ep−3(G|C) = b0 ⇒ . . . ⇒ e0(G|C) = e(G|C) = b0 = f(C).
Case 2. C 6= B and min(C) = 1. Since C 6= B, there exists q ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} such that
ep+q(G|C) = 1. This in turn implies that
eq−1(G|C) = 1. (1)
Indeed, if q = p − 1, then ep+q(G|C) = 1 implies e2p−1(G|C) = 1. Since ep−1(G|C) = 1,
it follows that ep−2(G|C) = 1, establishing (1). On the other hand, if q < p− 1, then (1)
follows from the fact that ep+q(G|C) = 1 and max(C;R(q − 1)) = 1.
From (1) and the definition of the orderings R(q − 2), . . . , R(0), we obtain
eq−1(G|C) = 1 ⇒ eq−2(G|C) = 1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ e0(G|C) = e(G|C) = 1 = f(C).
Case 3. C 6= B and min(C) = b0. Recall that b0 6= 1. Therefore 1 6∈ C and we obtain
ep−2(G|C) = b0 ⇒ ep−3(G|C) = b0 ⇒ . . . ⇒ e0(G|C) = e(G|C) = b0 = min(C) = f(C).
Case 4. C 6= B and min(C) 6∈ {1, b0}. In this case again, 1 6∈ C.
Case 4.1. b0 6∈ C. Since 1 6∈ C and b0 6∈ C, there exists q ∈ {1, . . . , p − 2} such that
ep+q(G|C) = min(C). By definition of R(q − 1), . . . , R(0),
ep+q(G|C) = min(C) ⇒ eq−1(G|C) = min(C) ⇒ . . . ⇒ e0(G|C) = e(G|C) = min(C) = f(C).
Case 4.2. b0 ∈ C and min(C) < b0. Then ep−1(G|C) = min(C) 6∈ {1, b0}, hence
ep−2(G|C) = min(C). By definition of R(p − 3), . . . , R(0) and because ep+q(G | C) /∈
{1, b0} for q ∈ {1, . . . , p− 2}, we obtain
ep−2(G|C) = min(C) ⇒ . . . ⇒ e0(G|C) = min(C) = f(C),
which completes the proof.
Our next lemma extends the result of Lemma 1 to all choice functions of degree 1.
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Lemma 2 Every choice function of degree 1 is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Proof. Suppose f is a choice function of degree 1 on A = {1, . . . ,m}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the underlying ordering R∗ is the natural ordering ≤ on A. As
in the proof of Lemma 1, the best element in a non-empty subset B of A according to R∗
can thus be written as min(B). Let B0 be the unique critical set of f with respect to ≤.
Thus, f(B0) > min(B0) and f(B) = min(B) for all B ∈ P(A) \ {B0}. If B0 = A, then f
is backwards-induction rationalizable by Lemma 1. From now on, assume B0 6= A.
Consider the restriction of f to P(B0). By Lemma 1, there exists a game G0 on B0
that backwards-induction rationalizes this restriction. In particular, this implies that
e(G0|B0) = f(B0). (2)
Now define a game G on A as depicted in Figure 4. The root of the tree is 0. The set
of decision nodes D is given by the union of {0, 1, 2} and the set of decision nodes D0 of
G0. Label all decision nodes of G0 so that no ambiguities can arise. The set of terminal
nodes T is the union of the set of terminal nodes T0 of G0 and 2 + |A \ B0| additional
distinct nodes. We only depict the outcomes assigned to these terminal nodes but not the
labels attached to them.
Define ≺ on D ∪ T as follows: 0 is the direct predecessor of 1 and of one of the
additional terminal nodes, 1 is the direct predecessor of 2 and of another of the new
terminal nodes, 2 is the direct predecessor of the remaining |A \B0| new nodes and of the
root of the tree G0, and the restriction of ≺ to D0 coincides with ≺0.
Let g be such that g(n) = g0(n) for all terminal nodes n ∈ T0 and as displayed in the
figure for all other nodes. Note that g assigns a different alternative in A \ B0 to each
node in the subset labeled A \B0.
The preference assignment R is such that R(0) = R∗, R(1) has f(B0) as its best
element, followed by the remaining alternatives in A in their natural order, and R(2) first
ranks the alternatives in A other than f(B0) in their natural order and has f(B0) as its
worst element. Each ordering R(n) corresponding to a decision node n of G0 is such that









































































































































































































































f(B0) min(B0) A \B0































Figure 4: The game G on A in the proof of Lemma 2.
We now show that G is a backwards-induction rationalization of f . Let B ∈ P(A).
To show that e(G|B) = f(B), we distinguish three cases.
Case 1. min(B) < min(B0). This implies that min(B) 6∈ B0 and, thus, min(B) ∈ A\B0.
Because min(B) < min(B0) < f(B0), we have min(B) 6= f(B0), hence min(B)R(2)b
for all b ∈ B. It follows that e2(G|B) = min(B). Thus, e1(G|B) = min(B) because
min(B)R(1)min(B0). Finally, we obtain e(G|B) = e0(G|B) = min(B) because min(B)
R(0)f(B0).
Case 2. min(B) = min(B0). We consider two subcases.
Case 2.1. B = B0. Thus, e(G0|B0) = f(B0) by (2). Because f(B0) 6∈ A \ B0, it follows
that e2(G|B0) = f(B0). By definition of R(1), f(B0)R(1)min(B0) and, thus, e1(G|B0) =
f(B0). Thus, by definition of the tree G, we obtain e(G|B) = e(G|B0) = f(B0) = f(B).
Case 2.2. B 6= B0. Two further subcases are distinguished.
Case 2.2.1. B ∩ B0 = B0. In this case, e(G0|(B ∩ B0)) = e(G0|B0) = f(B0). Since
B ∩ (A \B0) 6= ∅ and f(B0) is the worst element according to R(2), we obtain e2(G|B) ∈
A \ B0. Hence, e2(G|B) 6= f(B0). Because min(B0) = min(B), it follows from the
11
definition of R(1) that e1(G|B) = min(B0). Because min(B0) < f(B0) and R(0) is equal
to ≤, we obtain e(G|B) = min(B0) = min(B).
Case 2.2.2. B ∩ B0 6= B0. Since G0 backwards-induction rationalizes the restriction of
f to P(B0),
e(G0|(B ∩B0)) = min(B ∩B0) = min(B) = min(B0)
because both B and B0 must contain min(B) = min(B0). Since min(B) = min(B0) 6=
f(B0), we have min(B)R(2)b for all b ∈ B ∩ (A \ B0). Therefore e2(G | B) = min(B).
Next, e(G|B) = min(B) because min(B) = min(B0)R(0)f(B0).
Case 3. min(B0) < min(B). In this case min(B0) 6∈ B and hence B ∩ B0 6= B0. This
implies
e(G0|(B ∩B0)) = min(B ∩B0).
Again, we consider two subcases.
Case 3.1. min(B) = f(B0). Then we obtain e(G|B) = f(B0) = min(B) immediately
from the definition of R(0).
Case 3.2. min(B) 6= f(B0). Two further subcases can be distinguished.
Case 3.2.1. min(B) ∈ B0. In this case, e(G0|(B∩B0)) = min(B∩B0) = min(B) 6= f(B0).
By definition of R(2),
e2(G|B) = min{min(B ∩ (A \B0)), e(G0|(B ∩B0))}
= min{min(B ∩ (A \B0)),min(B ∩B0)}
= min(B).
Because min(B0) 6∈ B, it follows that
e1(G|B) = min(B). (3)
Since min(B) 6= f(B0), either min(B) < f(B0) or min(B) > f(B0). In the first case, (3)
and the definition of R(0) imply that e(G|B) = min(B). In the second case, f(B0) /∈ B
and (3) therefore implies e(G|B) = min(B) by definition of the game G.
Case 3.2.2. min(B) ∈ A \B0. Now min(B ∩ (A \B0)) = min(B) 6= f(B0). If e(G0|(B ∩
B0)) 6= f(B0), the definition of R(2) implies
e2(G|B) = min{min(B ∩ (A \B0)), e(G0|(B ∩B0))}
= min{min(B), e(G0|(B ∩B0))}
= min(B).
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If e(G0|(B ∩B0)) = f(B0), the definition of R(2) implies
e2(G|B) = min(B ∩ (A \B0)) = min(B).
In both cases e2(G|B) = min(B). Since min(B0) 6∈ B, it follows that e1(G|B) = min(B).
The conclusion that e(G|B) = min(B) now follows by the same argument as in case 3.2.1.
Using the result of the above lemma, our theorem establishes that all choice functions
are backwards-induction rationalizable.
Theorem 1 Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Proof. Every best-element rationalizable choice function is trivially backwards-induction
rationalizable and Lemma 2 shows that every choice function of degree 1 is backwards-
induction rationalizable. We prove the theorem by induction on the degree of irrationality
of a choice function. Let k > 1 and, as our induction hypothesis, suppose that every choice
function of irrationality degree 1, . . . , k−1 is backwards-induction rationalizable. Consider
a choice function f on A = {1, . . . ,m}. Suppose that f is of degree k and let the ordering
R∗ underlie f . Without loss of generality, let R∗ be the natural ordering ≤ on A. Let
C = {C1, . . . , Ck} be the collection of critical sets of f with respect to R∗. Thus, by
definition, f(C) 6= min(C) for all C ∈ C and f(C) = min(C) for all C ∈ P(A) \ C. Pick
C1, C2 ∈ C. We have
f(C1) 6= min(C1) and f(C2) 6= min(C2). (4)
For i ∈ {1, 2}, define the choice function
fi(C) =
{
min(Ci) if C = Ci,
f(C) if C ∈ P(A) \ {Ci}.
By construction, each fi is of irrationality degree less than k and, by the induction hy-
pothesis, fi is backwards-induction rationalizable by a game Gi.
Let R0 be an ordering on A such that f(Ci)R0min(Ci) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Observe that
such an ordering exists if and only if
f(C1) 6= min(C2) or f(C2) 6= min(C1). (5)
To see that (5) is implied by (4), suppose that, by way of contradiction,
f(C1) = min(C2) and f(C2) = min(C1).
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Since f(Ci) ∈ Ci for i ∈ {1, 2}, we must have f(C1) ≤ f(C2) and f(C2) ≤ f(C1), hence
f(C1) = f(C2) because ≤ is antisymmetric. But then we obtain
f(C1) = f(C2) = min(C1) = min(C2),
contradicting (4).
Now construct a game G on A by letting the root 0 be such that it is associated with
the ordering R(0) = R0 and has two direct successors, namely, the roots of G1 and G2,
and all other characteristics of the game G are inherited from G1 and G2 in the obvious








































































































Figure 5: The game G on A in the proof of Theorem 1.
By construction, we have
e(G|C) = max({e(G1|C), e(G2|C)};R0)
for all C ∈ P(A).
If C 6∈ {C1, C2}, it follows that e(G1|C) = e(G2|C) = f(C) and hence e(G|C) = f(C).








If C = C2, the above argument can be repeated with the roles of the labels 1 and 2
interchanged.
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